Introduction
Group membership management in IP Multicast and Anycast suffers from potential Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. With Multicast, a malicious host that joins a group can overflow the network by adding branches to the group delivery tree. In contrast, a malicious host that joins an Anycast group will not be able to flood a network but can redirect the traffic and prevent other legitimate hosts from seeing it. The source of the problem is that currently routers cannot verify whether a particular host is authorized to join a particular group. The problem is sometimes referred as the Proof-of-Membership Problem [1] . We propose a solution to this problem for IPv6, based on Group Cryptographically Generated Addresses (G-CGA), which are an extension of CGA (Cryptographically Generated Addresses) for Group addresses (Multicast and Anycast groups). In particular, we define two types of G-CGA addresses: M-CGA for multicast and A-CGA for anycast. We use these addresses to severely limit certain classes of DoS attacks. Our proposal is fully distributed. It does not require any trusted third party or pre-established security association between the routers and the hosts. This is not only a huge gain in terms of scalability, reliability and overhead, but also in terms of privacy.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 is an overview of Multicast and Anycast in IPv6, as well as of MLD, the protocol used for group management. Section 3 deals with our motivations: it describes the security liabilities in MLD, and includes our problem statement. Section 4 presents our proposal. Section 5 discusses how this proposal benefits privacy considerations. Finally Section 6 concludes the paper.
A more detailed version of this paper is available as [2] .
Multicast and Anycast Groups
The Internet Protocol (IP) defines two types of groups: Multicast and Anycast groups.
IP Multicast
Internet Protocol (IP) Multicast defines network support that allows IP traffic to be sent from one or multiple sources and delivered to multiple destinations without sending individual packets to each destination. A single packet is sent by a source to a Multicast group, which is identified by a single IP address. The network is then responsible for duplicating the packet and delivering it to each member of the group. IP Multicast distinguishes between multicast routers and multicast listeners. Nodes register dynamically with a group by sending either IGMP (Internet Group Membership Protocol) messages [3] (if using IPv4) or MLDv2 (Multi-cast Listener Discovery) [4, 5] messages (if using IPv6). Since our solution is specific to IPv6, in the subsequent discussion we will assume this process is carried out via MLDv2. Unless otherwise noted, in this paper MLD refers to MLDv2. Nevertheless, IGMPv3 and MLDv2 are essentially identical except for the size of the addresses carried and the fact that the latter uses ICMPv6 message types instead of IGMP. Since the differences are largely immaterial, this document refers to previous work on securing IGMPv3, given the dearth of equivalent material for MLDv2.
Routers use MLD messages to discover which groups on their directly attached links have active multicast listeners. Conversely, nodes use MLD to express interest in certain multicast groups and thus become multicast listeners.
IP Anycast
An IPv6 Anycast address is an address that is assigned to a set of interfaces (typically belonging to different hosts). Thus an IPv6 Anycast address defines a group but as opposed to multicast group a packet sent to an Anycast address is not routed to all members of the group but only to the source's "nearest" one [6] . All interfaces belonging to an Anycast address usually reside within a topological region defined by an address prefix. Within this region, each member must be advertised as a separate "host route" entry in the routing system. A router that is member of an Anycast group will advertise its membership using the routing protocol (RIP, OSPF, BGP, etc). A host that wants to join an Anycast group will have to use a group membership protocol, such as MLD [7] , to register with the local router(s) that will then propagate this registration to the region using the routing protocol.
Motivations

MLD-Specific Attacks
As described in [4, 5] and [1] , MLD is prone to the following attacks.
Query messages
A forged Query message from a machine with a lower IP address than the current Querier will cause Querier duties to be assigned to the forger. If the forger then ignores Listener Report Messages, traffic might flow to groups with no members.
A forged Query message sent to a group with members will cause the hosts which are members of the group to report their memberships. This causes a small amount of extra traffic on the LAN, but causes no protocol problems.¯R eport messages A forged Report message to join a group may cause routers to assume there are members of a group on a link where, in fact, none exist. The fake Report messages are only harmful if there are no other hosts in the LAN interested in the Multicast group. The effects of such fake reports are: -The local router will create state for the group reported in the fake report message. This might be the source of a DoS attack: an attacker could send numerous report messages for different groups just for the sake of creating state at the local queriers.
-If the group address is fake (i.e. there is no source), a fake report may generate signaling traffic in the network.
-If the group address is valid (i.e. there is at least one active source), the local router will send routing messages into the network infrastructure. This will have different effects according to whether the group is a Multicast or an Anycast group. If the group is a Multicast one, the routing messages will create states in the Multicast router infrastructure, and add branches to the Multicast tree resulting in additional traffic. A malicious host could use this attack to overflow a network. If the group is an Anycast group, the routing message will also create additional states in the network infrastructure, that will possibly redirect all the Anycast traffic to the malicious host, leading to a Denial-of Service attack (DoS).
In addition to the above, a forged State Change Report message to leave a group will cause the Querier to send out Group-Specific Query messages for the group in question. This causes extra processing on each router and on each member of the group, but cannot cause loss of desired traffic. [4, 5] present some defences against such externally forged messages. Local forged State Change Report messages are more difficult to prevent.
Routers that receive MLD messages must verify that the source is link-local. This requirement defends routers from forged MLD messages originated off-link. The attacks described previously are therefore only possible by local hosts.
Problem Statement
The goals of our work is to propose a solution to the security problems related to the Report messages presented previously. These problems are exacerbated in mobile environments, as in constantly varying environments, routers do not necessarily know the Multicast listeners. It is therefore difficult to authenticate them. This problem is referred in [1] as the Proof-of-Membership problem, i.e.: a router will process a Report message from a host for a specific group, only if this host can prove that it is a legitimate member of the group. The proposed solution must satisfy the following objectives:
The solution should be "light", i.e. should not be too expensive in terms of computation, memory or bandwidth.
The solution should be scalable, i.e. able to support a very large number of members per group and a large numbers of groups.
The solution should support mobile hosts efficiently. It should therefore provide fast group registration and should not assume any pre-established contexts in the routers.
Avoid reliance on a global infrastructure such as a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) as much as possible.
Avoid reliance on a Trusted Third Party (TTP) as much as possible.
As far as the two security issues with forged Query messages are concerned, we believe that the problem related to Querier selection is solvable. For example, all routers of a link could share a secret key. It would then be enough for routers to verify the authenticity of the Query messages. The problem related to fake routers causing extraneous traffic by sending fake Query messages is much harder to solve. This problem, known as the fake bank teller problem, is not specific to group communication. This issue of validating routers or, in general, nodes that offer services remains an unsolved authorization problem in the Internet at large. [8] presents the concept Cryptographically Generated IPv6 addresses. CGA addresses were proposed to solve the IPv6 address ownership problem, and are generally useful to secure redirect operations in numerous protocols. For example, in Mobile IPv6 [9] , a node starts using its home address, and, each time it moves to a different link, it issues a Binding Update that specifies its current address. The issue is in handling these Binding Updates securely. Why should the correspondent node believe the mobile node when it claims that it does, in fact, own the home address contained
Proposal Overview
Review of CGA IPv6 address
[8] associates to each host a public-private key pair and derive CGA addresses from it. A CGA IPv6 is a valid IPv6 address. The top 64 bits are the host's routing prefix. The bottom 64 bits, the Cryptographically Generated Host Identifier (CGHID) [8] , are derived from the host's public key as follows:
(1) Where imprint is a 64-bit field and PK is the public key associated with the host.
The generated CGHID must be compared against a list of well-known Anycast addresses [10] and the value 0. If there is a conflict, the host can retry using a different imprint, or, alternatively, start from the beginning by generating a new public-private key pair.
Note that, usually, IPv6 refers to the bottom 64 bits of an address as the "interface identifier". In contrast, the CGHID is a "host identifier". If the host has more than one address (because it is multihomed or has several interfaces), it could use the same CGHID for its addresses or generate different addresses by using different imprint values. In any case, the same public-private key pair is used. In general, the CGHID identifies a host, an IP stack and not just any particular interface.
When a host wants to prove to its correspondent node that it owns its CGA address, it reveals its public key, the imprint and signs its message(s) with its private key. The correspondent node then verifies that (1) the interface identifier was derived from the public key and the imprint and, (2) that the signature is correct, and therefore that the host knows the private key component. As a result, this address belongs to the host because no other hosts could have used an imprint and public-private key pair combination that hashes to the same CGHID.
As detailed in [2] , CGA address collisions are very unlikely, so they are statistically unique. For further details on CGA, please refer to [8] .
Group CGA Addresses (G-CGA)
In this paper, we propose to extend the CGA concept to group addresses in order to solve the proof-of-membership problem in group management. We defined two new types of addresses, namely the Anycast CGA Address (A-CGA) and the Multicast CGA Address (M-CGA).
Multicast CGA Addresses (M-CGA)
An IPv6 Multicast address is an identifier for a group of interfaces (typically on different nodes). An interface may belong to any number of Multicast groups. Multicast addresses have the following format [6] :
binary 11111111 at the start of the address identifies the address as being a Multicast address.
flgs is a set of 4 flags. The high-order 3 flags are reserved, and must be initialized to 0. The last bit, T, is set to to indicate a permanently-assigned ("wellknown") Multicast address, assigned by the Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA). T = 1 indicates a non-permanently-assigned ("transient") Multicast address.
scop is a 4-bit Multicast scope value used to limit the scope of the Multicast group.
group ID identifies the Multicast group, either permanent or transient, within the given scope.
We propose to associate to each group a public-private group key pair. The Multicast-CGA (M-CGA) address of this group is then an IPv6 Multicast address whose group ID is an 112-bits long CGI (Cryptographically Generated Identifier) i.e.
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Anycast CGA Addresses (A-CGA)
Similarly to the Multicast case, we define IPv6 A-CGA (Anycast Cryptographically Generated) addresses. Anycast addresses are allocated from the unicast address space. Thus, Anycast addresses are syntactically indistinguishable from unicast addresses [6] . An Anycast CGA address is then generated as described in Section 4.1.
Protocol Overview
Our proposal relies on Group CGA address to solve the proof-of-membership problem.
Our scheme uses authorization certificates (for example SPKI [11] certificates). It assumes that (1) the group address is a G-CGA address (as in the basic scheme) and that additionally (2) each member of the group has a (unicast) CGA address (this was not required in the basic scheme).
The main steps of this scheme are:
1. The group controller generates the group's Publicprivate key pair and derives from it the Group CGA as described in Section 4.2.
2. The group controller generates for each authorized member a certificate (see [2] for details about the SPKI certificate we use) that states that the host, defined by its CGA address, is authorized to join the group defined by the G-CGA address. This cerficate is signed with the private key whose public key was used to generate the G-CGA address. It contains the group public key that was used to generate the G-CGA address, a validity period, the group controller address and the member CGA address.
3. A host that wants to join or leave the group must include the certificate, its public key (the one used to generate its CGA address), and signs the resulting messages with the private key whose public key was used to generate its unicast CGA address.
A router that receives a Report message for a
Group CGA address must verify the host's proof-ofmembership to the group by verifying that: (1) the certificate is valid, i.e. that its signature is correct, that the validity period is still valid and that the group address was generated from the group public key. (2) the MLD message is valid, i.e. that the member's CGA address was generated from the public included in the message, that the member's CGA address is the same than the one contained in the certificate and that the signature is valid (i.e. the host owns the CGA address).
After these two steps the router has the assurance that the member (1) the authorization certificate is valid and (2) it is used by the legitimate member (it has not be stolen).
If the proof-of-membership is correct, then the router processes the report message normally, otherwise it rejects it.
Note that the authorization certificate contains all the necessary information and that the routers that receive such as certificate do not have to contact any server nor to have some pre-establised states (keys,etc). As a result, this scheme is very scalable and well adapted to mobile environment. Additionally, it solves all the problems of the basic scheme. In fact, the certificate-based scheme:
1. provides membership expiration. Each certificate has a validity field. When the validity of a certificate expires, the member needs to get a new certificate. The group controller can then refuse to re-issue the certificate, in effect, excluding the member if necessary. This use of short-term certificates avoids the need for a revocation system.
2. does not require a secure channel between the group controller and the group members for the private key distribution.
3. does not have the private key disclosure problem because the private key is not revealed by the group controller.
The format of the SPKI certificate that is used by this scheme is described in [2] .
Privacy Considerations
Group Structure Privacy
By solving the "group membership problem" via group CGA addresses (either in M-CGA or A-CGA format), it is possible (and quite natural) to not disclose to the routers any information beyond what is absolutely necessary for them. In particular, other proposals [1] require at least that the group controllers or key issuers reveal their identity to the routers as part of distributing the tickets. Group CGA addresses obviate the need for such contact between the routers and any third parties or group controllers. This is not only a huge gain in terms of reliability and overhead, but also in terms of privacy. In fact, a MLD report message only reveals the CGA address of the group and the current address of the subscribing member. This group CGA address is basically an identifier and does not provide any information about the group, the group controller or the members identities. For further privacy guarantees, the subscribing member's current address should be configured using the IPv6 address privacy extensions defined in [12] in order to hide the subscribing member's identity. As a result, a router that receives an MLD message will know only that a group that uses a group CGA address exists and that there is at least one member on its links.
Traffic Privacy
For certain groups, traffic confidentiality is a requirement. The certificate-based proposal could be leveraged to provide this as well. For example, a group controller(s) could create a shared secret to be used for traffic encryption. But how would it communicate this shared secret to each and every one of the group members?
As part of joining a group, a host obtains an authorization certificate either from the group controller or from a node authorized by it. In this "induction" step each host is explicitly addressed by the group. At this very useful moment of induction, the group can (in addition to issuing the authorization certificate) communicate to the receiving host the shared secret. The shared secret would be encrypted using the public key of the target host, so only the intended recipient would be able to decrypt and use it.
Notice that this does not add any new communication requirements. The existing induction step is leveraged to provide one more service to the inductee: enabling it to participate in encrypted group communications. This is a very useful service, but there are some limitations in this simple scheme. For example, it is not a good idea to use the same shared encryption key during the entire lifetime of the group. But how to change the keys? Assuming short-lived certificates, the often-repeating induction step could be used to communicate new keys. It may be necessary to use windows of synchronization between group memberships durations (as specified in the per-host authorization certificates issued by the group controller) and the shared keys used. In other words, it may be simpler to follow the approach taken with the authorization certificates, in which their duration is used to impose membership expiration, instead of providing for explicit membership revocation. In similar manner, it may be easier to provide for shared encryption key expiration by specifying a limited lifetime for the keys (in terms of a time after which the key is valid, and a time beyond which it must not be used). This constitutes the activation period for the keys.
If a hosts waits for the key to expire, it may be unable to decrypt traffic for some duration of time. This may be avoided if the induction step is treated as a registration. The host would need to re-register with the group periodically in order to obtain the required membership authorization certificate as well as the corresponding encryption key(s) (which may not become active until some time in the future). Assuming some numbering on the generation of the key used, it may be possible for all member hosts to switch to new keys without very fine grained time synchronization.
This could be done along the following lines:
1. The group controller creates some keys in advance, for example, Ã ½ Ø ½ Ø ¾ , Ã ¾ Ø ¾ Ø ¿ , Ã ¿ Ø ¿ Ø , Ã Ø Ø ...Ã Ø Ø ·½ , where Ã is the key, its activation period is defined by start and end times Ø and Ø ·½ , and is the key index. Notice that it is possible to create keys during the lifetime of the group. Of course, the group controller must endeavor to create the keys and begin distributing them in advance of their activation period (that is, before they are used to encrypt traffic).
